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Abstract: 
Organizations apply information security risk assessment (ISRA) methodologies to systematically and
comprehensively identify information assets and related security risks. We review the ISRA literature and identify
three key deficiencies in current methodologies that stem from their traditional accountancy-based perspective and a
limited view of organizational “assets”. In response, we propose a novel rich description method (RDM) that adopts a
less formal and more holistic view of information and knowledge assets that exist in modern work environments. We
report on an in-depth case study to explore the potential for improved asset identification enabled by the RDM
compared to traditional ISRAs. The comparison shows how the RDM addresses the three key deficiencies of current
ISRAs by providing: 1) a finer level of granularity for identifying assets, 2) a broader coverage of assets that reflects
the informal aspects of business practices, and 3) the identification of critical knowledge assets. 
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1 Introduction 
To sustain competitive advantage in a knowledge economy, organizations need to protect their knowledge 
and information assets such as intellectual property (IP), trade secrets, product blueprints and business 
strategies (Ahmad, Bosua, & Scheepers, 2014a). A comprehensive and effective information security 
management (ISM) strategy begins with an accurate information security risk assessment (ISRA). An 
effective ISRA attempts to provide a prioritized estimation of the likelihood and impact of a range of 
security scenarios, with each scenario considering potential threats to organizational assets and existing 
protective controls (Shedden, Ruighaver, & Ahmad, 2010a; Ahmad, Maynard, & Park 2014b). ISRAs then 
guide the strategic selection of security controls to protect information resources (Dhillon & Backhouse, 
2001). Established ISRA methodologies such as the operationally critical threat, asset, and vulnerability 
evaluation (OCTAVE), facilitated risk analysis process (FRAP), platform for risk analysis of security-critical 
systems (CORAS), and central-communication-and-telecommunication-agency risk analysis and 
management method (CRAMM) have been developed with supporting tools and documentation that tailor 
control implementations to each organization (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002; den Braber, Hogganvik, Lund, 
Stølen, & Vraalsen, 2007; Peltier, 2001; Stølen et al., 2002; Yazar, 2002).  
However, recent studies into the practice of applying ISRA methodologies in organizations report that they 
take a limited perspective of organizational “assets”, which ultimately leads to inaccurate security risk 
assessments. We can identify three significant deficiencies. First, ISRAs typically adopt a traditional 
accountancy-based view of assets that sees them as discrete and relatively static categories of 
information that one can enumerate for auditing purposes, which leaves ISRAs with a coarse-grained view 
of relevant assets and the related risks. Second, ISRAs tend to be restricted to those assets that are 
visible in a formal business process view and do not take a sufficiently social and organizational 
perspective that recognizes the informal work practices and workarounds in which assets exist and 
evolve. Third, the strong focus on information that ISRAs adopt can lead analysts to neglect the less 
visible but essential organizational knowledge that creates and supports it. Taking insights from the 
knowledge management (KM) field, we need to identify knowledge as a kind of asset worthy of protection, 
notwithstanding its less tangible existence in the “fluid mix of framed experiences, values, contextual 
information and expert insight” (Davenport & Prusak, 1998, p. 5).  
Given these three areas of deficiency, we address the following question in this paper: 
RQ:  How might the identification of information and knowledge assets be improved in ISRAs? 
Broadly, we argue that ISRA methodologies must incorporate a richer perspective of business practice to 
be able to identify and protect important information and knowledge. To this end, we propose a novel rich 
description method (RDM) that adopts a richer and more holistic view of assets and use appropriate data 
collection and analysis techniques to uncover them. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we overview the ISM literature and clarify the three broad 
limitations of asset identification in current ISRAs. In Sections 3 and 4, we report a case study of an 
engineering company (ArchiFirm) to compare the application of an existing risk assessment methodology 
(Section 3) with the application of our rich description method (RDM). We use the RDM to construct 
qualitative descriptions of business processes that capture the rich context behind the interactions, 
relationships, motivations, and desires of various actors in the work of ArchiFirm. In Section 5, we 
compare the findings of the traditional ISRA and our novel RDM and argue that the RDM provides a 
valuable complement to existing approaches that addresses the three deficiencies identified. In Section 6, 
we discuss the paper’s contributions to theory and implications for further research and practice. Finally, in 
Section 7, we conclude the paper. 
2 ISRMs and Asset Identification 
Information security risk management methodologies (ISRMs) are the means by which organizations 
systematically identify and actively protect their information assets and, thereby, attempt to minimize 
tangible and intangible losses (Blakley, McDermott, & Geer, 2001; Eloff & Eloff, 2005; Reid & Floyd, 
2001). Through the phases of a traditional ISRM, an organization develops a plan to achieve a desired 
and cost-effective future state of information security (Standards Australia, 2004a). This plan specifies 
choices about what controls to implement so as to mitigate or reduce security risks (Shedden et al., 
2010a).  
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When following an ISRM, the organization needs to identify the following: the assets critical for its 
operations; the threats to each asset’s confidentiality, integrity, and availability; and asset vulnerabilities 
(Alberts & Dorofee, 2002; den Braber, Hogganvik, Lund, Stølen, & Vraalsen, 2007; Finne, 2000; Stølen et 
al., 2002). The organization then quantifies each risk in terms of its consequences and likelihood of 
occurring (Peltier, 2001), which produces a prioritized list of risks for further action (Alberts & Dorofee, 
2002; Roper, 1999). Managers must then consider how to control the higher priority risks by selecting one 
of four basic strategies: avoidance, mitigation, transference or acceptance (Whitman & Mattord, 2014). 
Finally, the organization must continue to monitor its situation after implementing controls to ensure that 
they are maintained and actually achieve the desired level of coverage (Standards Australia, 2004a). 
2.1 The Information Security Risk Assessment (ISRA) 
In this study, we are concerned with just the information security risk assessment (ISRA) part of a full 
ISRM. Though many studies have used the term “risk assessment” interchangeably with other terms, 
including “risk analysis” and “risk evaluation” (Frosdick, 1997), we define an ISRA as comprising context-
establishment, risk-identification and risk-analysis, but we exclude risk control (Dhillon, 2007; 
Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa, 2002).  
ISRAs, then, focus on how an organization identifies individual risks defined as the probability of a 
negative occurrence that threatens the achievement of objectives (Standards Australia, 2004b; Slay & 
Koronios, 2006). Risks are assessed and expressed in terms of how likely they will occur and the impact if 
they did (ISO/IEC, 2001; Stoneburner et al., 2002). The information security literature notes that risks exist 
at the intersection of three things: assets, threats, and vulnerabilities (Cooper & Johnson, 2003; Gerber & 
von Solms, 2001; Jones & Ashendon, 2005; Kokolakis, Demupoulos, & Kiountouzis, 2000; Roper, 1999).  
Identifying risks typically comprises two sub-phases: 1) identifying assets and 2) identifying threats and 
vulnerabilities. In other words, identifying risks entails providing a list of critical information assets the 
organization needs to protect and identifying their vulnerabilities and potential threats that could exploit the 
assets (Reid & Floyd, 2001). 
2.2 Understanding the Significance of Asset Identification 
What counts as an information asset is a critical decision in an ISRA. Information assets are typically 
understood to be any information of value to an organization (Peltier, 2001) that, therefore, requires some 
measure of protection (Standards Australia, 2004a). The ISM literature typically sees information assets 
as: hardware, software, data, and information; people who support and use the IT system; 
communications equipment; and various services, such as utilities (Alberts, Dorofee, Stevens, & Woody, 
2003; Standards Australia, 2004b; Hamilton, 1998; Stoneburner et al., 2002; Warren & Hutchinson, 2003). 
Because they are a primary source of value, researchers regard information assets as a sensible unit of 
analysis when conducting ISRMs (Alberts et al., 2003; den Braber et al., 2007; Moody & Walsh, 1999; 
Peltier, 2001; Roper, 1999).  
The first step in the ISRA process is to systematically discover and select all relevant information assets 
that the organization holds. One uses the same system of categorization as described for ISM above 
(Alberts et al., 2003; Bass & Robichaux, 2001; Landoll & Landoll, 2005; Lichtenstein, 1996; Visintine, 
2003). Organizations must identify all information assets in the scoped system to inform accurate 
decisions in the future (Standards Australia, 2004a). Each information asset in an organization will have 
some level of value (Spinellis, Kokolakis, & Gritzalis, 1999). However, budgetary and time constraints 
mean that assessment of risks cannot be made for all of them (Roper, 1999). The ISRA process must 
decide which information assets are essential or critical for the system under review (Alberts et al., 2003; 
Cooper & Johnson, 2003).  
Once an organization has identified its critical information assets, it attempts to accurately and completely 
define the threats to each (Stacey, Halsley, & Baston, 1996). Here, one needs to identify the outcomes of 
a successful attack on each asset, such as the possibilities for destruction, modification/corruption, or 
interruptions to access or operation (Farahmand, Navathe, Enslow & Sharp, 2003). One determines the 
specific impacts with reference to the three important states of the affected information: its confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability. 
ISRAs are process driven and guide organizations through the steps of understanding and assessing their 
information security risks. Popular ISRA methodologies include FRAP, CRAMM, COBRA, OCTAVE, and 
CORAS (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002; den Braber et al., 2007; Dhillon, 2007; Peltier, 2001; Yazar, 2002). 
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Although these methodologies differ in their composition, order, and depth of activities, they generally 
follow a three-stage pattern: 1) establish the context, 2) identify the risks, and 3) analyze the risks (Dhillon, 
2007; Shedden et al., 2010; Whitman & Mattord, 2014). The outcome of the risk assessment depends on 
the organization’s setting the correct scope for assessing risks (the first phase), generating an accurate 
inventory of assets and the associated risks to those assets (second phase), and accurately estimating 
the probabilities and impacts for each risk (third phase).  
2.3 Limitations of Asset Identification 
The ISM literature generally agrees that ISRA outcomes are frequently inaccurate because of 
shortcomings in the early asset identification phase (Siponen, 2005b; Spears, 2006; Webb, Ahmad, 
Maynard, & Shanks, 2014; Zafar & Clark, 2009). In particular, Salmela (2008, p. 2) and Dhillon and 
Backhouse (2001, p. 142) note that ISRA methodologies tend to focus on technological assets such as 
hardware and software rather than people, knowledge, and practice.  
We contend that the asset identification phase of current ISRAs has three general deficiencies. First, the 
phase results in a coarse level of granularity of assets. When applying traditional ISRA methodologies, 
many organizations tend to default to a high-level assets (Shedden et al., 2010). For example, they often 
identify a whole information system, such as a database or content management system, as a single 
asset. In this way, they treat these complex technologies as “black boxes” without distinguishing their 
various functions, modes of use, and different areas of informational content. Consequently, they cannot 
easily identify particular risks associated with particular component elements. This inability to correctly 
identify risks results partly from inappropriately applying the methodologies and partly from the methods 
themselves not providing guidance to drill down to a deeper level of detail (Lichtenstein, 1996; Shedden et 
al., 2010). An organization taking this approach might be successful in identifying the higher-level, generic 
and broader risks around their broadly-defined information systems. However, it would not readily 
discover those risks specific to particular information assets, such as individual servers, hot-desk laptops, 
printer rooms, social media functions, and so on. In reality, each of these neglected elements might be 
subject to their own special threats and vulnerabilities and, hence, have a unique risk profile. 
Second, traditional asset identification identifies formally recognized assets but neglects the co-existing 
informal activities that are typically necessary for the organization to work in practice. Current ISRA 
methodologies consider assets as discrete objects and largely ignore the social and processual aspects of 
information systems (Ahmad et al., 2005; Rohrig & Knorr, 2004; Spears, 2006). Historically, information 
security focused on physical, mechanical issues related to procedurally and physically separate batch-
processing facilities (Gerber & von Solms, 2005). But information systems today are deeply embedded in 
a rich social environment and influenced by user behaviors that are part of informal work practices (Brown 
& Duguid, 2002; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; Spears, 2006). As such, we need a more holistic socio-
organizational view of security (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; Shedden, Scheepers, Smith, & Ahmad, 2011; 
Siponen, 2005a) because these social, practice-based aspects bring with them distinctive and significant 
risks. In particular, information assets are not static—they evolve and change as people use and create 
them dynamically as part of their formal and informal work routines and even in formal business 
processes (Ahmad, Ruighaver, & Teo, 2005; Brown & Duguid, 2002; Farris, 1979). In reality, work 
environments are flexible and even chaotic, and individuals pursue workaround activities and shortcuts 
using their own initiative (Sasse & Flachais, 2005). If ISRAs do not consider actual practices, they clearly 
have limited value for improving an organization’s risk profile and, consequently, will most often only 
identify high level and abstract information assets. 
Third, traditional asset identification does not recognize knowledge assets as distinct and important 
entities. By knowledge asset, we mean a distinct category of what the organization knows collectively that 
enables it to perform competitively. In an in-depth case study of a software engineering firm, Shedden et 
al. (2011) explored the limitations of the traditional asset perspective. They applied a traditional ISRA to 
the organization and examined the resulting outcome from a knowledge perspective. They found that the 
risks identified by the traditional ISRA belonged to four categories: 1) systems, 2) data, 3) people, and 4) 
applications. Further, they found that the traditional view of information assets did not allow analysts to 
capture the critical tacit and explicit knowledge held both individually and in a distributed form. While the 
traditional asset-oriented view simply pointed out security risks related to key individuals, it failed to 
identify the specific vulnerabilities resulting from the poor distribution of sensitive knowledge and a related 
over-dependency on key knowledge-holders. 
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3  Case Study of ArchiFirm Part 1: Applying a Traditional ISRA 
The three deficiencies in current ISRAs point to the need to modify and extend the practice of information 
security risk assessment. We now report a study to explore how one might do so. We designed the study 
as a case study of information security asset identification in a selected real organization to compare two 
approaches: 1) a traditional ISRA of the sort described above and 2) a new approach that we call the rich 
description method (RDM) and that uses more probing data-collection and analysis techniques drawn 
from qualitative field research methods. We intended to discover if these more probing techniques could 
effectively address the three limitations of current ISRAs. We adopted the case study method given its 
suitability to capture complex real world phenomena, such as organizational risk (Darke, Shanks, & 
Broadbent, 1998; Dubé & Paré, 2003; Yin, 2009). 
This section reports part 1 of the case study in which we applied a traditional ISRA. In Section 3.1, we 
provide the background to the case study organization, and, in Section 3.2, we describes the selected 
traditional ISRA that we applied and briefly illustrates the kind of assets that that methodology identified. In 
Section 4, we report part 2 of our study to develop and apply our RDM that sought to go beyond the scope 
of the traditional ISRA. 
3.1 The Case Study Organization: ArchiFirm 
Our case study examined an Australian civil engineering company ("Archifirm") that provides soil testing, 
drafting, and engineering services to the state of Victoria's high-volume house-building sector. We chose 
ArchiFirm for three main reasons. First, it is a small company of about 60 staff, which allowed us to gain 
an understanding of its overall operation and context in a reasonable timeframe. Second, ArchiFirm’s work 
involved communicating across multiple sites with many kinds of expertise; hence, its reliance on 
information flow and knowledge management were highly visible and accessible to study. Third, 
ArchiFirm’s staff recognized information security issues. This awareness was heightened because 
ArchiFirm had recently lost a key employee with critical knowledge necessary to operate a core business 
process. As a result of this incident, ArchiFirm recognized that its existing security processes were 
inadequate and, therefore, had already begun to investigate ISRA methodologies. As such, ArchiFirm 
provides a representative case (see Yin, 2009; Seddon & Scheepers, 2012) but also one that was readily 
accessible and receptive to our plan to assess and compare ISRA methodologies.  
ArchiFirm had two key departments: a soils department with 10 employees, and an engineering 
department with 40 employees. We focus on a key business process, described as the soils and 
engineering process, which spans across these two departments. The soils department conducted on-site 
soil tests to determine land composition, which influenced subsequent engineering decisions. The 
engineering department then developed drafts of a structure's foundations and beams. Depending on the 
soil type, engineers then calculated the dimensions of these structural components to best support the 
future building. An office manager headed the administrative function of the organization that ensured that 
work flowed smoothly through the office and identified bottlenecks. Both soil and engineering personnel 
needed to be familiar with client-specific requirements. These requirements dictated client preferences on 
the types of materials in the supporting structure, such as metal and wood, and how they should format 
reports.  
The soils and engineering (SE) process represented an opportunity to study the three areas of limitation in 
standard ISRAs that we identify in Section 2. The SE process depended on various and significant forms 
of expert knowledge. Early observations indicated significant flexibility and workarounds were necessarily 
to ensure that the formal business process worked smoothly in practice. Further, the SE process 
represented the organization’s primary purpose and was the means by which the firm generated its 
revenue. Indeed, if this process did not deliver accurate calculations and reliable data for decision making, 
the firm risked structural instability, delays in construction, additional unnecessary expenses, and 
significant reputational loss in a highly competitive field. Also significant was that, due to the nature of 
work, the integrity of the process was important for the health and safety of employees. 
From a competitiveness perspective, ArchiFirm has accrued considerable organizational knowledge in the 
context of this key business process. In particular, over time, the organization has compiled a unique 
“recipe book” comprising a range of different soil templates. These templates, associated learning, and 
various informal works practices are central to ArchiFirm’s ongoing competitiveness. 
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3.2 Applying a Traditional ISRA Methodology: OCTAVE-S 
As a representative exemplar of traditional ISRA methodologies, we applied the operationally critical 
threat, asset, and vulnerability evaluation methodology for small organizations (OCTAVE-S) to our case 
organization. OCTAVE-S is a subset of a larger ISRA methodology, OCTAVE, developed by Carnegie 
Mellon University as a comprehensive, asset-focused approach to identifying and treating organizational 
information security risks (Alberts et al., 2003, p. 3). OCTAVE is a self-directed ISRA methodology that 
allows organizations to self-study and conduct risk assessments so that they can capture their own 
technical knowledge (Alberts et al., 2003). The methodology claims to leverage people’s knowledge of 
their organization’s practices and processes to determine its current state of security readiness. Risks to 
the identified critical assets determine which areas of improvement are needed and inform the 
development of a security strategy (Alberts et al., 2003, p. 3). While some ISRA methodologies focus on 
technology, OCTAVE-S focuses on organizational risk and practice-related issues. Hence, one might 
expect OCTAVE-S to do relatively well on the areas of limitation that we set out to investigate. 
Other ISRA methodologies include CRAMM (ver. 4), CORAS, FRAP, OCTAVE, COBRA, and international 
standards, such as AS/NZS 4360:2004 (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002; Standards Australia, 2004b; Peltier, 
2001; Stoneburner et al., 2002; Yazar, 2002). We conducted a feasibility study of these methods to 
determine which would be the most appropriate for our study. Ultimately, we selected the OCTAVE-S 
methodology due to its rigor and alignment with industry and research ISRA methodology “best practice” 
(Shedden et al., 2010). OCTAVE-S is also widely applied with good support for its validity (Satchidananda 
& Shanthamurthy, 2004; West, Crane, & Andres, 2002; West & Andrews, 2003). 
Table 1. Risk Analysis Team Participants in OCTAVE-S Workshops 
Participants Number of sessions Total duration
IT developer 
Engineering-IT partner 
Office manager 
13 14 hours 
Because OCTAVE-S is self-directed, the organization selects three to five individuals to form a risk-
analysis team. The team then identifies and analyzes its critical risks to establish organization-wide 
security strategies and asset-based risk-mitigation plans (Alberts et al., 2003). The method helps the team 
to identify critical information assets based on their alignment with business objectives. Subsequently, 
OCTAVE-S conforms to the typical ISRA phases, including context establishment, risk identification, risk 
analysis, and risk control. It is structured around three phases that contain one or more “processes” with 
multiple “activities”. In phase 1, one constructs asset-based threat profiles. In phase 2, one identifies 
vulnerabilities by examining computing infrastructure in relation to critical assets. Finally, in phase 3, one 
develops a security strategy by identifying and analyzing risks and then develops protection and mitigation 
plans. 
We facilitated the implementation of OCTAVE-S at ArchiFirm by guiding the company to establish a 
riskanalysis team as Table 1 shows. We facilitated 13 workshop sessions with this team to work through 
the prescribed list of formal, structured questions, with associated predefined templates and worksheets to 
identify and analyze the firm’s security risks. As OCTAVE-S requires, the team provided a balance 
between an operational and organizational perspective, an information-flow perspective, and an IT 
perspective (Alberts et al., 2003). The engineering-IT partner and IT developer made up the IT department 
of the firm. The engineering-IT partner fulfilled a top-management function, including security 
management and network administration. The IT developer performed more technical tasks, including 
developing and managing the organization’s database and website, providing support for staff desktops, 
and handling incidents. The office manager brought substantial knowledge of the business by describing 
ArchiFirm’s operations and information assets across all departments. The IT developer also possessed 
strong knowledge of departmental information asset requirements throughout the business. Table 2 
provides an illustrated sample of the critical assets identified through the implementation of OCTAVE-S at 
ArchiFirm. 
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Table 1. Illustrative Sample of Critical Assets Identified through OCTAVE-S 
Critical asset Asset type Rationale for selection
Database 
system System 
The database contained all past and current job information. Without the database, 
ArchiFirm would be unable to register, track, and update orders. 
Engineering 
software 
Services/ 
application 
Engineering software refers to AutoCAD and CadeComp, two critical applications 
required by the drafters and engineers in the day-to-day production of the drafts. 
ArchiFirm would be incapable of completing jobs without these applications. 
Desktop 
computers System 
The desktops were the means by which all people in the organization performed their 
work. If a large number of desktops were rendered inoperable, employees would be 
unable to access critical software functions and work could not progress. 
Web system System 
The Web system was the means by which most of ArchiFirm’s clients booked jobs 
and observed their progress. If the web system failed, ArchiFirm would not be able to 
receive the majority of its job orders. 
Backups Information 
Backups were integral to ArchiFirm’s ongoing operations. The backups were copies 
of all information flowing through ArchiFirm’s systems. If any information was lost, as 
happened frequently, the firm used the backups to restore past information states to 
ensure continued operations. 
4 Case Study of ArchiFirm Part 2: Applying a Rich Description Method 
Part 2 of our case study concerned developing and applying a RDM. For simplicity, we describe what the 
RDM involved in advance of illustrating its findings, although, in practice, we refined it via conducting the 
investigation and it is itself an output of the study. One has many ways of using rich methods of data 
collection to enhance ISRAs, and, thus, we present our particular RDM as illustrating a wider class of 
approaches. We focused on determining if this kind of data collection and analysis might overcome the 
identified shortcomings of ISRAs. Figure 1 overviews the six activities of our RDM, including data 
collection, analysis through rich descriptions, and outputs. Before explaining these steps in detail, we 
describe the rationale and motivation for our RDM in Section 4.1. In Sections 4.2 to 4.5, we outline each of 
the activities of Figure 1 and provide illustrations of the resulting data and analysis. 
 
Figure 1. Rich Description Method: Data Collection, Analysis, and Output 
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4.1 Rationale for a Rich Description Method 
Our proposed RDM relies on recognizing the distinction between the formal and informal aspects of 
organizations and the distinction’s implications for information security. By formal aspects, we mean the 
official view of the organization captured in such things as structure charts, designated roles, duty 
statements, and key business processes (Farris, 1979). By informal aspects, we mean the unofficial 
working patterns, attitudes, and dispositions of staff that arise and exist through the organization's social 
fabric. The concept of “business practice” is central to understanding the informal aspect of organizations 
(Hislop, 2009). While business process refers to a set of formally known activities and tasks that staff carry 
out (Davenport & Prusak, 1998), business practice refers to interrelated but distinct social patterns and 
informal ways of working (Sasse & Flechais, 2005) that staff create through improvisation and propagate 
through storytelling and shared experiences (Brown & Duguid, 2002). While a process perspective 
concerns the way organizations conduct work in a routine and predictable manner (Brown & Duguid, 
2002), a practice perspective draws our attention to the various workarounds, informal flows of 
information, and unofficial activities that are needed to get work done. From a security point of view, such 
informal actions have implications for the security environmen, and might result, for example, in the 
accidental leakage of information or the duplication and distribution of information assets in a way not 
picked up by traditional ISRA methods that focus purely on the formal side of the organization. 
While traditional ISRAs focus on the formal and easily reportable elements of organizations, the RDM we 
propose here draws attention to both formal and informal aspects and the relationship between them. On 
the formal side, our RDM focuses on business processes as a framework for its investigation. But, around 
this, it explores related informal aspects of work via in-depth interviews and detailed analyses in the form 
of rich process narratives and rich process maps (see Figure 1). The term “rich description” has its 
grounding in soft systems methodology's (SSM) “rich pictures” and ethnographic “thick” descriptions 
(Geertz, 1994). Like these techniques, our rich descriptions attempted to capture the informal and subtle 
dimensions of actors’ organizational life, including their actions, beliefs, intentions, relationships, 
motivations, and desires (Denzin, 2001). The act of developing a rich description, then, offers to immerse 
the information security analyst into the organizational environment beyond the scope of a typical ISRA 
project while staying in its practical time and budgetary constraints. 
In devising an RDM, we focused on identifying critical organizational knowledge as a kind of valuable 
asset that organizations need to protect. However, this knowledge typically resides in informal business 
practices (Brown & Duguid, 2001; Hislop, 2009). Although explicit knowledge is likely to be formally 
documented and available to traditional ISRAs, vital tacit knowledge will remain hidden. By definition, one 
cannot articulate tacit knowledge to ISRA analysts, and it is typically evident only in situations where one 
applies and acquires it (Hislop, 2009; Nonaka, 1994; Tsoukas, 1996). That is, tacit knowledge is heavily 
grounded in organizational practice, and, typically, one cannot separate this kind of “knowing” from “doing” 
(Cook & Brown, 1999; Gherardi, 2000). Likewise, organizations also embed significant and valuable 
methods for cultivating organizational knowledge in practices. Staff can learn through formal inductions 
and training, but more often they learn through less visible acts of experimentation and sharing ideas 
(Hislop, 2009; Nadler & Tushman, 1980). Therefore, much critical knowledge and the mechanisms of 
acquiring it are likely to be invisible to a traditional ISRA, which confirms the need for an RDM to identify 
them and their attendant security risks. 
4.2 Data Collection for the Rich Description Method: Observation, Interviews, 
Document Analysis 
Our proposed RDM involved six interrelated activities (see Figure 1). In the first stage, we collected data 
in three concurrent and interrelated steps: we analyzed company documents, observed work in practice, 
and conducted semi-structured interviews with participants whose work related to the particular business 
processes under review. The main researcher (the first author) conducted all of these data-collection 
steps. He conducted the semi-structured interviews with 11 participants, each interviewed several times 
(see Table 3). Interviews varied in length due to the differing complexity of tasks, activities, and 
organizational seniority. We formulated questions to be exploratory and to elicit details about the 
information, knowledge, and operational aspects surrounding each step of the process. Based on 
information we derived from company documents and from observing work in action, we designed 
questions to probe information flows, the information lifecycle, work behaviors, and the role of critical 
knowledge. We found it important to incorporate opportunities for follow-up questions and deeper 
examination of intriguing responses. Interviews designed and conducted in this way are an effective 
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means of capturing the rich detail surrounding work practices, particularly of knowledge and the artifacts 
that individuals use in computer-assisted work (Wood, 1997). The workplace observations augmented the 
interview data by showing how users engaged in work, especially where tacit knowledge was critical 
(Wood, 1997). We gathered the main documents relating to ArchiFirm’s business processes, including 
process charts, reports, forms, emails, photographic images, and maps. We found these artifacts to be 
highly informative about the formal and informal aspects of work and the forms of information that could 
potentially leak to rivals. 
Table 3. Participants in RDM Interviews
Participant role Department # of sessions Interview duration 
Accountant Administration 3 2 hours 
Engineering partner Engineering department 3 2.1 hours 
Senior soils report writer Soils department 4 2.2 hours 
Head drafter Engineering department 2 1.2 hours 
IT developer IT department 4 2.2 hours 
IT partner IT department 3 3 hours 
Managing director Corporate 2 1.6 hours 
Office manager Administration 2 2 hours 
Order entry admin Administration 2 1 hour 
Soils partner Soils department 4 1.8 hours 
Soils report writer Soils department 2 1 hour 
4.3 Rich Process Maps 
Based on the three forms of data collected (see Figure 1), we constructed a rich description of selected 
processes at ArchiFirm through two analysis techniques carried out in tandem. First, we constructed rich 
process maps that we initially drew as standard workflow models using business process modeling 
notation (BPMN) methodology (e.g., Dumas, La Rosa, Mendling, & Reijers, 2013). BPMN provided a 
formal view of each process to which we annotated comments about each step's relationship with the 
informal knowledge and activities of business practices, which Figures 2 and 3 illustrate.   
 
Figure 2. Information Flows in BPMN with Rich Description Markups) (P Denotes a Physical Document and D 
Denotes a Digital Document) 
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Using BPMN provided a way to establish a coherent picture of the process and allowed us to explore 
potential gaps in the evidence. Its diagrammatic representation provided an effective and concise medium 
to express relationships between processes and practices (Checkland, 2000; McFadzean, 1998; Venters, 
Cushman, & Cornford, 2002). We used BPMN's "information artifacts" to document the key "containers" of 
information (Ahmad et al., 2005; Bernard, 2007) around which security threats arose. We labeled the 
containers with P for "physical" or D for “digital" to make their format explicit as a resource to reason about 
security risks. Most valuable, however, was our use of annotations in the diagrams to document the 
informal context around information flows, activities, and information “containers”, which allowed us to 
make explicit the knowledge requirements for each task and to identify who held that knowledge. We 
further used annotations to capture details such as the movement of physical information throughout the 
office buildings and site locations.  
Figure 3. Representing Critical Knowledge in BPMN
We found that attempts to incorporate all information flows, activities, and departments/individuals onto 
one process map quickly complicated matters. As such, instead, we constructed two kinds of process 
maps: the first outlined information flows and information containers (e.g., Figure 2) and the second 
focused on the knowledge requirements for activities (e.g., Figure 3). In this format, we found the 
diagrams to be useful resources to examine the processes’ security vulnerabilities. For example, we could 
see the following things more clearly: the transfer of information in either physical and digital form as an 
official part of the process, the flow of information between containers, where residual copies of the 
information ended up as the process proceeds, what critical information might be leaked through unofficial 
work practices, and the criticality and vulnerability of organizational knowledge. 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems 307
 
Volume 39   Paper 15  
 
4.4 Rich Process Narratives 
In tandem with constructing the rich process maps, we also wrote rich process narratives that comprised 
story-based accounts of the flow of work (Figure 4 shows an example). These narratives reflected the 
formal sequence of tasks as captured in the rich process maps, but they were more versatile in being able 
to capture the idiosyncratic aspects of the informational infrastructure required to perform tasks and the 
information and data produced, manipulated, disposed of, disclosed, and/or recorded and stored. We 
wrote narratives to express the experiences of the people performing tasks with respect to the knowledge 
deployed, information used, and other contextual elements. In this way, we could capture and express the 
informal aspects of work to a greater extent than with the rich process maps alone.  
The identification of the physical settings in which tasks were carried out turned out to be highly relevant 
to risk assessment. Traditional ISRAs typically neglect this aspect, but we found it to be significant when 
considering the type and severity of information security risks. While the interview data typically reflected 
individual perspectives and varied significantly across different levels and areas of the organization, the 
rich process narratives brought together this evidence into a coherent account. This analysis technique 
also captured insights into the informal aspects of surrounding work practices.  
Figure 4. Illustrative Passage from a Rich Process Narrative 
4.5 Extended Asset Identification Tables 
Using both the rich process maps and rich process narratives enabled a more extensive identification of 
information security assets that the organization needed to protect. Our RDM helped to break down the 
highly visible physical assets that the risk analysis team identified through OCTAVE-S into their separate 
components, including specific documents, desktops, servers, and databases. More significantly, the 
RDM techniques encompassed all these physical “containers” to identify important classes of information 
and knowledge as critical assets. Through using the rich process maps and rich process narratives, we 
produced extended asset identification tables that summarized these critical assets as entries in a 
database.  
Shedden et al. (2010) theorize that capturing and analyzing activities in a business process provides a 
richer view of the information assets required to operate in that activity. Capturing and analyzing these 
activities involves identifying infrastructural, information, and/or data assets that support, are used by, or 
are produced by such activities. Furthermore, by analyzing the formal and informal information flows 
between activities, one can identify potential information leakage from containers and storage devices (as 
per Ahmad et al., 2005; Bernard, 2007). Table 4 shows examples of entries in an information assets table. 
Importantly, by adopting a practice perspective, one can identify critical knowledge. Knowledge is integral 
to business processes and is typically embedded in an organization’s practices. Therefore, one needs 
methods to identify critical knowledge assets with sufficient granularity and to pinpoint the risk of that 
knowledge’s leaking. Table 5 shows examples of entries in a knowledge asset table. 
The information asset table (Table 4) lists each identified asset, its type, its official location, and its 
container. This format is consistent with ISRA methodologies, including OCTAVE-S, but provides an 
extended list of information assets at a finer level of granularity. The table also shows informal information 
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assets and their “unofficial” containers and locations. These informal assets form an “information residue”, 
by which we mean the array of unofficial copies that are produced and left behind as a by-product of the 
formal process. Examples of these unofficial locations include employees’ home PCs or removable 
storage devices. Clearly, these unofficial copies represent sources of potential leakage risk. 
We used the knowledge asset table (Table 5) to identify and name the categories of knowledge that were 
critical to effective operation of the processes under review. Each item of knowledge in the table related to 
these key business process, which, in turn, underpinned the value of this knowledge to the business. For 
each knowledge asset, the table describes its explicit and tacit elements and identifies the employees who 
possessed the knowledge. The table represents a useful resource for the analyst team and for the 
managers of the critical knowledge that warrants protection. The table also highlights potential 
vulnerabilities associated with critical knowledge (e.g., knowledge possessed by only one key individual).  
Table 4. Representative Entries from an Extended Asset Identification Table (Information Assets)
Asset Type Official location 
Official 
container  
type 
# of 
Copies Unofficial location(s) 
Unofficial 
container 
type 
Soils faxed 
order forms Information 
Server 1 
 
Digital 
 4+ 
Soil partner's PC, 
Server 1 (email), 
Laptops 
Digital 
 
Photographs Information Folder Physical 4+ Temporary hard-copies given to co-workers Physical 
Soil report Information Server 1 Digital 2+ Soil partner’s PC Digital 
AutoCAD Application Desktops Digital Unknown # Home computers Digital 
Eng. Excel 
templates Application Desktops Digital 
Unknown 
# Home computers Digital 
QuickBooks Application Desktop, Laptop Digital 8 Nil Nil 
Server 1 System Eng-IT partner's office Physical 
4 
(backups)
Engineering-IT partner’s 
desk, car, home Digital 
Backups Information 
On-site 
storage device 
on server 
Digital 4 
Engineering-IT 
Partner’s desk, car, 
home 
Digital 
 
Table 5. Representative Entries from an Extended Asset Identification Table (Knowledge Assets)
Knowledge 
asset 
Possessor of 
knowledge Description 
Soil test job 
allocation 
knowledge 
Soils partner 
The soils partner knew where his soil testers lived and where they generally 
performed their work, which made work allocation more efficient by reducing travel 
times for testers. 
Soil report 
checking 
knowledge 
Soils partner & 
senior soils 
report writer 
The soils partner and senior soils report writer possessed considerable knowledge 
of local geology, particularly the soil composition of suburbs that ArchiFirm 
services. These knowledgeable individuals identified many potential errors. 
Client 
requirements 
drafting 
knowledge 
Head drafters 
& drafters 
Drafters worked with specific subsets of clients. The cumulative knowledge of each 
client’s situation and requirements were paramount for ensuring high-quality work 
with few errors. 
Process 
management 
knowledge 
Office 
manager 
The office manager had in-depth knowledge of the process workflows, points of 
contact, individuals’ personal work habits, and bottlenecks. She could diagnose 
workflow issues early, follow-up lost orders, and re-organize job orders to ensure 
that ArchiFirm remained productive. 
Database 
maintenance 
knowledge 
IT developer 
The IT developer was the only person in ArchiFirm who understood how to operate 
the database, including its range of functionality, methods of debugging, and 
general maintenance. 
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5 Comparative Findings  
We now compare the findings from the two parts of our case study of ArchiFirm to explore whether and in 
what ways our RDM overcame the limitations of traditional approaches to asset identification that we 
identify in Section X. We argue that the RDM brings significant benefits and does offer improvements for 
all three of these limitations. 
5.1 A Finer Grain of Information Asset Identification 
The first limitation concerns the coarse grain of asset identification in traditional ISRAs. Following the 
steps of OCTAVE-S, the risk analysis team at ArchiFirm (Table 1) identified a set of significant information 
assets (see Table 2). The method focused the team on infrastructural elements, which they described as 
“applications” and “systems”. However, when compared with the outputs of our RDM (see Table 4), the 
assets identified through OCTAVE-S were, as expected, at a very coarse level of granularity. In 
comparison, the infrastructural assets that we identified through the RDM were consistent with those that 
OCTAVE-S produced but had a greater range. By adopting an operational process perspective, through 
the BPMN-based rich process maps, the RDM made finer infrastructural distinctions between components 
such as the organization’s Web system, job-booking system, database system, backups, and desktops. 
Similarly, the RDM identified conceptual information assets that the traditional ISRA overlooked. Using 
rich process maps and rich process narratives led to our identifying significant day-to-day operational 
resources, such as the soil and drafting templates, soil testing data, accounting scripts, and accounting 
data. This finer level of granularity that the RDM enabled provided a stronger basis to subsequently 
identify risks and to establish risk profiles around each asset. To confirm our general observation that our 
RDM produced a finer-grained analysis, Appendix A overviews the information assets that the RDM 
discovered and shows how many OCTAVE-S did not explicitly identify. One might argue that an ISRA 
does not need to identify assets in such detail because one can adequately assess their associated risks 
and treat them as part of larger-scale entities. However, there is a danger that by failing to make the 
component assets explicit, OCTAVE-S becomes a blunt tool for pinpointing specific risks and 
recommending later controls.  
Importantly, with its ability to identify information containers and categories at a finer granularity, RDM 
points to the risks that an organization will lose data to uncontrolled containers and external parties. The 
rich process maps and rich process narratives provided useful resources to evaluate such risks relating to 
key data and information by considering their sensitivity from a confidentiality perspective and their 
exposure to possible leakage when at rest, in transit, and in use. That is, these techniques helped the 
analyst to reason about whether any unauthorized parties had access to information repositories (data at 
rest), if information flowed to authorized recipients in a secure manner (data in transit), and if data was 
being used in a secure manner (data in use). These lines of analysis promise to inform future decisions 
about the adequacy of current technical and non-technical security controls, which in turn will influence 
choices of targeted investment and improvements in security controls. 
5.2 Broader Coverage of Information Assets to Encompass Informal Business 
Practices 
The second limitation of current ISRAs concerns their breadth of coverage and, in particular, their focus 
on the formal aspects of the organization at the neglect of informal business practices. A part of OCTAVE-
S that we conducted but do not report on here is its "vulnerability assessment", which places each critical 
information asset in an IT infrastructural context. Through predefined lists and diagrams and tables, this 
vulnerability assessment identified systems, people, and hardware linked to each information asset. 
However, despite tracing all of the connections between information and containers, the OCTAVE-S 
methodology identified no possibilities for information leakage. The method specifically asked the 
ArchiFirm risk analysis team for the official storage locations for each information asset with the question 
“Where would you go to get an official copy of the asset?”. However, the use of the word “official” in this 
question did not prompt them to consider the possibility that there might be a residue of unofficial copies 
produced as a by-product of the business process and left on various non-secure containers such as 
personal laptops, discarded print-outs, email attachments, and so on. In general, the manner in which 
OCTAVE-S framed its analysis of information assets did not promote consideration of the informal aspects 
of surrounding business practices. 
310 Asset Identification in Information Security Risk Assessment: A Business Practice Approach
 
Volume 39   Paper 15  
 
In contrast, the RDM deliberately traced organizational workflows “on the ground” to examine how 
ArchiFirm conducted its work in practice, including workarounds and temporary holdings of information. As 
we intended, the rich process maps and rich process narratives captured both formal activities, such as 
staff’s copying information assets into folders and onto the servers, and informal activities, such as staff in 
the soils department’s copying, scanning, and communicating assets to external work environments. As 
we have noted already, such informal activities bring new risks that became apparent through the RDM. 
One example concerned the creation of personal and informal backups of company data. Given the 
frequency with which staff accidentally deleted or inadvertently overwrote files, these backups were clearly 
valuable in ensuring individuals could continually access critical data. However, as the analysis 
documented, an IT partner created and informally stored backups on BYODs on an office desk, in a car, 
and at a place of residence. This situation presented a range of possible threats to confidentiality because 
the various back-up locations were not easily protectable from a host of interception-based security risks. 
Looking beyond our case-study, one can clearly see this kind of trade-off between availability and 
confidentiality that arises through informal work practices in the recent trend of organizations’ adopting a 
bring-your-own-device (BYOD) policy. Such policies increase the range and severity of risks because 
unofficial copies of assets can proliferate on mobile devices. While security analysts and office managers 
now widely recognized the existence of this kind of risk, similar risks around informal business practices 
are not so easily identified. Our RDM provides a promising approach to discovering them. 
5.3 The Identification of Knowledge Assets 
The third area of limitation concerns whether and how the organization recognizes organizational 
knowledge as an asset that it needs to protect. Although members of the OCTAVE-S risk analysis team 
identified important people in ArchiFirm, they did not specify categories of organizational knowledge and 
their importance. In comparison, the techniques of the RDM guided the analysis towards the various 
elements of critical knowledge directly related to work tasks. ArchiFirm saw these elements as necessary 
to complete its work and for its competitiveness in its business environment. 
OCTAVE-S focused the risk analysis team on examining people in the organization from an availability 
perspective. Its structured questions and templates did elicit responses about the general skills that a 
department brought to the organization, which did occasionally involve the label "knowledge". For 
example, the risk analysis team identified the IT team as critical for the organization’s information 
systems. They reasoned, as documented in their report, that the IT developer and IT-engineering partner 
held “particular knowledge and experience in the area” of IT and understood “programming, processes 
and workflows, hardware, applications and environment knowledge in IT”. But these observations did not 
specify the many essential practice-based elements of knowledge that were identified under the RDM, 
such as how to use applications, perform checks, or produce drafts conforming to clients’ requirements. 
OCTAVE-S’s focus on key people and their availability, as opposed to a richer view of knowledge assets, 
limits the kind of threats that can be identified to loss of service and consequent harm to reputation, 
finances, productivity, and personnel safety. OCTAVE-S treats these "people" risks through security 
training, security management, and contingency planning initiatives. The ArchiFirm analysis team grew 
frustrated with the OCTAVE-S method when determining a mitigation approach for a “people” asset. The 
team members commented that they could not understand how a change in the “contingency planning” 
mitigation area would reduce the risk of a person’s being absent beyond having the other IT-related 
person present or contactable. 
In contrast, the interviews that we conducted under our RDM included questions designed to elicit 
categories of organizational knowledge, to determine who held the knowledge, and what the security 
requirements were. Through the rich process maps and rich process narratives, we probed tacit forms of 
knowledge (e.g., Hislop, 2009) that were only describable indirectly in relation to one’s ability to conduct 
certain tasks or engage in certain practices effectively.  
For example, consider the “client requirements drafting knowledge” category that the drafters and the 
head drafter held. This category clearly includes explicit knowledge about the standard procedures, rules, 
and templates for drafting. But, to perform their work efficiently and effectively, the drafters hold rich tacit 
knowledge about the particular needs and desires of particular clients and client groups. Drafters gain this 
tacit knowledge through the experience of working on reports for these clients and may learn it via 
socializing with other drafters. If ArchiFirm lost access to this tacit knowledge, it might still produce its 
drafts, but the product would be of a lower quality, which would likely threaten its competitiveness. Also 
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relevant here, and in need of protection, are the mechanisms for cultivating and maintaining this critical 
knowledge, such as the acts of work-based socialization between drafters. 
Our RDM further identified difficult trade-offs in how ArchiFirm handled its knowledge assets. For example, 
the trade-off between availability and confidentiality; in other words, the dilemma between sharing 
knowledge in the firm and potentially leaking it to rivals. An interesting instance of this issue concerned 
junior engineers who often moved to ArchiFirm’s rival firms to advance their careers. One might consider it 
detrimental to ArchiFirm’s long-term competitiveness to share too much process knowledge with 
individuals who were likely to leave. A different issue was that, when analysis exposed the vulnerability of 
a single individual’s holding vital knowledge, ArchiFirm often found it difficult to find a way to share the 
knowledge more widely. For example, the RDM pointed to the fact that one key individual, the office 
manager, held the knowledge about an important administrative area (i.e., how to manage the flow of 
work through ArchiFirm's main business processes). ArchiFirm had made attempts to share this 
knowledge with another administrator prior to the office manager’s taking a lengthy period of leave but 
without success. In only two months of the office manager's absence, ArchiFirm experienced significant 
productivity problems without the “know-how” to avoid process bottlenecks. 
6 Discussion 
In our case study, we explored whether a richer analysis of an organization's information security assets 
could address limitations in current ISRAs as used in the security industry. The rich description method 
(RDM) that we devised and evaluated in the study combined techniques from qualitative field research 
and systems analysis methodologies, including semi-structured interviews, richly annotated business 
process modelling notation workflows, and scenario writing. Overall, we found that, when applying both 
our novel RDM and the traditional OCTAVE-S to the same organization, the RDM uncovered a greater 
range and depth of information security assets that needed protection. Specifically, we demonstrate that 
our RDM shows promise in addressing three key limitations of traditional ISRAs: the coarse granularity of 
assets identified, the narrow scope of assets that focuses overly on the official view of the organization, 
and the lack of attention to knowledge as an important asset type. We now consider both the practical and 
theoretical implications of these findings. 
On the practical implications for industry practices of ISRA, two important qualifications must be made 
about these findings. First, while OCTAVE-S is a self-directed method that an organization’s own staff can 
apply, our RDM is not fully developed in this way and our study required the lead author to apply it as an 
analyst. This fact complicates our comparison of the two approaches because they could not be applied in 
exactly the same way. To remedy this imbalance, our lead author was present when ArchiFirm 
administered both OCTAVE-S and the RDM. For the former, the firm needed his guidance less because 
the method is self-explanatory; for the latter approach, his guidance was more instrumental in the 
procedure. As such, the analyst influenced how ArchiFirm identified its assets and, thus, potentially biased 
our results. Mindful of his ability to influence the findings, the lead author took care to let the findings 
follow from the demands of the techniques that the RDM involved, although the potential for bias 
remained a possibility. This imperfect design must be balanced against the advantage that our study was 
set in a live risk assessment context of an organization that was genuinely motivated to identify its assets 
for protection. 
Second, one might argue that the RDM produced a more detailed analysis, including of informal and 
knowledge aspects, simply because it spent more time collecting data than did OCTAVE-S. As Tables 1 
and 3 show, applying RDM required a greater amount of total time (about 20 hours) and demanded the 
involvement of more staff compared to the time spent applying OCTAVE-S (about 14 hours). However, 
given that the OCTAVE-S workshops involved all three senior staff, their total effort (42 person hours) was 
greater than that for RDM’s one-to-one interviews (20 person-hours). Nevertheless, the greater numbers 
of interviews under the RDM required more effort by the analyst team, and we found the interviews to be 
around 1.5 to two times longer than the time spent on the OCTAVE-S workshops in part because it took 
more time to gather details to construct process flows and write narratives than it did to answer OCTAVE-
S's structured questions. Further, the RDM requires much additional work beyond the interviews to 
construct and finalize the rich process maps and rich process narratives. Further, note that applying the 
RDM to more complex processes than those we reviewed in studying ArchiFirm, with greater involvement 
of different organizational units and staff, would likely require increasing time and effort to organize and 
carry out. 
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However, when reflecting on the experience of applying the RDM and OCTAVE-S, we conclude that it 
was not through brute force of extra time or resources that the RDM produced its extended view of assets 
that ArchiFirm needed to protect. Rather, the richer responses it elicited resulted from a different 
perspective inherent in the data-collection mechanisms. OCTAVE-S’s structured templates and 
worksheets oriented the risk analysis team toward the most tangible and easily identifiable assets, which 
tend to be the first answers that come mind in a group workshop when staff are asked to complete the 
fields of a structured template. However, behind them lurk other answers that staff might have provided 
through different forms of questioning and more imaginative scrutiny of the nature of organizational work. 
When conducting the RDM, the need to obtain the right kind of information to construct complete process 
models and complete narratives continually placed different demands on the interviewees. Questions 
probed the unmentioned and informal regions of work. For example, to probe the range of information 
assets, likely questions were: “Are there any assets the system users have created to assist in their 
work?”, “What information is contained in these personally derived assets?”, and even the more direct 
“Where would you go to receive unofficial copies of this information or data?”. Therefore, practically 
speaking, the two approaches differed mainly due to the RDM’s leading more naturally to open-ended 
reflection that exposed both the formal and informal aspects of the business processes under review. On 
this basis, we contend that the approach that the RDM adopts is a fruitful and practical direction for 
industry ISRA methodologies to explore. 
Turning to more theoretical implications, we conducted our case study to explore a new business practice 
perspective on information security in line with other challenges to traditional perspectives (Dhillon & 
Backhouse, 2001). A practice perspective is reflected in RDM through the inclusion of techniques to 
develop rich accounts of organizational activity, rather than structured data, to guide the identification of 
assets. A commitment to practice is also reflected in the approach of interviewing a broad range of staff, 
including those working within the processes under review, rather than the more narrow focus in 
OCTAVE-S on small teams of managers.  
One consequence of the practice perspective that underlies our RDM is to shift security theorizing away 
from a purely information technology focus (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; Guo, 2010; Siponen, 2005b; 
Zafar & Clark, 2009). Technology vulnerabilities and attacks remain a source of major concern and loss 
for organizations and a productive area of research. However, by probing the "actual" way that staff 
complete work, the RDM’s techniques facilitate analysts to examine not only the role of information 
technology but also the role of surrounding social interactions and a wide range of unofficial information 
artifacts, including paper-print outs, memory sticks, and so on. 
In our report of the findings, we observed how the RDM reveals a greater breadth of information assets. 
But there is a deeper point to be made here about the way traditional approaches favor a form of 
abstraction in analysis that reflects the traditional technical systems perspective. That is, traditional 
approaches seek to identify general classes of informational assets. In contrast, a practice perspective 
focuses more on reality than formal abstraction, and, hence, our RDM made important distinctions 
between the different instances (or copies) of the same information asset. A practice perspective 
recognizes that individuals frequently create temporary copies on the fly as part of routine work, whereas 
a traditional ISRA methodology focuses on high-level asset categories and official copies. Hence, a 
practice-based approach exposes the existence of informally created assets that are frequently not 
subject to the same security protocols, which manifests a different layer of information security risks. 
The practice perspective confronts rather than denies the organization’s informal side. As a result, among 
other things, it provides a stronger basis to observe and combat the leakage of business critical 
information into the wrong hands. The traditional concept of one static “official” copy of an information 
asset is often naïve. Instead, in practice, one should conceptualize information as a living entity. Unseen 
informal work practices often involve dissecting information into different fragments, copying fragments of 
collections of information between multiple devices, transmitting information to other parties, and 
transferring information across “containers”. In such a conceptualization, the possibilities for information 
leakage are multiple and various. We need to understand this complex, practical life of information. Future 
ISRA methods should establish an understanding that organizational information is not limited to “official” 
copies (Alberts et al., 2003; Bernard, 2007). We found the business process and narrative techniques in 
our RDM to expose at least some of the vulnerabilities of information leakage and to identify specific 
incidents of critical and sensitive information’s being copied or shifted to unofficial information containers.  
Further, the practice perspective as explored in our case study points to the need for a stronger 
connection between information security and the knowledge management field (e.g., Hislop, 2009). 
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Security research has largely ignored knowledge (and the practices around cultivating and sharing it) as 
an area worth investigating (Gold & Arvind Malhotra, 2001). The observation that knowledge is a valuable 
asset is not controversial, but our study illustrates that we need a shift in security perspective to 
appropriately reflect knowledge as an asset that one needs to protect. We need a fundamental shift away 
from the view that sees individuals as the assets towards one that acknowledges classes of knowledge as 
the assets. Different people may or may not possess classes of knowledge assets. If a person holds 
critical knowledge, firms can scrutinize knowledge management practices such as socialization and 
codification (Nonaka & Toyama, 2003) for the risks they raise to confidentiality, and, further, firms may 
regard them as potential security controls for threats to availability in other situations (Hansen, Nohria, & 
Tierney, 1999). 
7 Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Research 
In this paper, we argue and demonstrate that traditional structured ISRAs have limitations in the way they 
conceptualize and identify organizations’ information assets that they need to protect. We present an 
alternative approach called  the rich description method (RDM) (which we developed based on inspiration 
from ethnography’s “thick” descriptions), to help firms achieve a richer account of both their formal and 
informal aspects. The comparative results of applying a traditional ISRA and the RDM to the same 
company showed that the RDM identified a wider range and depth of information assets and could better 
identify organizational knowledge as an asset. As we argue throughout the paper, the RDM provided a 
more nuanced view that was potentially more informative when considering important vulnerabilities, such 
as possibilities for leaking sensitive information and competitive knowledge to rivals.  
We devised the RDM as a research vehicle to explore richer possibilities for collecting data and analyzing 
information security. We do not intend it as a fully formed or validated ISRA method. We do not present 
the RDM, therefore, as replacing traditional ISRAs. Rather, we claim that its use in our study 
demonstrates that richer data-collection and analysis techniques are available and promising and that, 
when used in conjunction with well-formed methods such as OCTAVE-S, they offer to extend the range of 
security assessments. Whether such techniques are valuable in practice depends on their cost-benefit 
ratio in particular circumstances. Of course, organizations might choose to use different methods for 
different part of their work; for example, they might choose to apply more probing RDM-style techniques 
only to their mission-critical organizational processes as was the case for the organization we studied in 
this paper. Another circumstance affecting the value of RDM in practice is whether the targeted processes 
are relatively stable or continuously changing. A detailed RDM-style investigation is probably most 
valuable for business processes that are complex but relatively stable such that the one-off cost would 
support future security controls for a longer term. 
We need further research to extend the current investigation by exploring other rich data-analysis 
techniques to chart the assets, vulnerabilities, and risks associated with organizations’ informal side. We 
also need to better understand the methodological context in which such techniques are applied. For 
example, it would be valuable to establish whether one could devise a self-directed form of the current 
RDM such that organizations could apply it by themselves with the same efficacy as we achieved in this 
study. 
In conclusion, we offer our RDM as a potential pathway for researchers to develop richer alternative 
information security risk methodologies. Our findings suggest that methods oriented towards business 
practices (and, thus, that encompass both formal and informal practices and that are sensitive to the risks 
of leaking knowledge about critical business processes to rivals) have great value. We argue that 
approaches such as the RDM are especially relevant for knowledge-intensive organizations where 
information and expertise constitute their primary competitive assets.  
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Appendix A: Comparison of Information and Knowledge Assets 
Identified between RDM and OCTAVE-S 
Table A1. Comparison of Assets Identified Between the RDM and OCTAVE-S  
RDM information assets 
identified OCTAVE-S equivalent 
Soils faxed order forms Job information and/or job booking system 
Soils delivered order Job Information and/or job booking system 
Photographs 
Not identified 
(Implicit under “job information”, though contextual discussion 
showed that job information related to orders forms) 
Soil report Drafts/final documentation (Implicit under “soils and survey system”) 
Soil report templates Not identified
Arch. drawings Job information 
Drafts Drafts/final documentation 
Engineered drafts Drafts/final documentation 
Checked engineered drafts Drafts/final documentation 
CadeComp Engineering software 
Eng. Excel templates Engineering software 
Accounting spreadsheets Not identified(Implicit under “accounting system”)
Accounting scripts Not identified(Implicit under “accounting system”) 
Handy backup Not identified(Implicit under “accounting system”) 
Accounting data Not identified (Implicit under “accounting system”) 
Database 
Not identified 
(Implicit under “database system”, though not specifically 
identified and established under the methodology) 
Database system Database system 
Soil test job allocation 
knowledge 
Not identified 
(No OCTAVE-S identified equivalent) 
Soil report checking 
knowledge Soils 
Drafting job allocation 
knowledge 
Not identified 
(No OCTAVE-S identified equivalent) 
Client requirements drafting 
knowledge 
Not identified 
(Drafting as a people-category asset does not include 
knowledge of client requirements) 
Client requirements 
engineering knowledge 
Not identified 
(The “principals/partners” people-category asset is the closest, 
but it referred to the partners’ ability to communicate with clients, 
and not to the critical knowledge of checking) 
Client-specific engineering 
checking knowledge 
Not identified 
(The “principals/partners” people-category asset is the closest, 
but it referred to the partners' ability to communicate with clients,
not to the critical knowledge of checking.) 
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Table A1. Comparison of Assets Identified Between the RDM and OCTAVE-S  
Process management 
knowledge 
Not identified 
(The “administration” people-category asset related more to 
tasks that the person performed, not to their knowledge of the 
organization) 
Database maintenance 
knowledge 
Not identified 
(The “IT department” people-category asset related more to the 
skills of the IT developer and his ability to code and deploy 
hardware, not necessarily to his knowledge of the database's 
operations and construction) 
Accounting script 
knowledge 
Not identified 
(Could be implicit under “accounts”, but this description of the 
people-asset category related more to the official knowledge of 
QuickBooks) 
Accounts checking 
knowledge 
Not identified 
(Discussion around “accounts” as a people-asset category did 
not relate to the checking processes that occurred to ensure that 
orders were entered appropriately) 
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